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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It was a glorious ending! Never, in
these United States, has the brain of
man conceived, or the hand of man fash-
ioned, so perfect a thing as the clipper
ship. In her, the long suppressed
artistic impulse of a practical, hard-
working race burst into flower. The
Flying Cloud was our Rheims, the Sover-
eign of the Seas our Parthanon, the
Lightning our Amiens; but they were monu-
ments carved in snow. For a brief moment
of time they flashed their splendor around
the world, then disappeared with the com-
pleteness of the wild pidgeon. l
Thus eloquently writes Samuel Eliot Morison of
the passing of a great era in the long and colorful heri-
tage of the American merchant marine. So, too, he
alludes to the technical genius of American shipbuilders
who repeatedly throughout the years have created and sent
to sea ships without peer in the world of shipping. How
then has it come to pass in the late twentieth century
that the United States, which depends more than ever
before on commerce carried in ships, has suffered a
precipitous decline in the ability of its merchant marine
to provide for its legitimate commercial and security
needs?
2Since the end of World War II the United States
has divested itself of the largest merchant fleet the
world has ever known. Between 1941 and 1945 the Maritime
Commission built 5,695 ships totalling more than 6.3
million displacement tons 2• By 1946 this merchant fleet
was larger than the merchant fleets of all other countries
in the world combined, and it carried more than 78 percent
of all U.S. oceanborne imports and exports. In the years
since then, however, this great commercial force and
national asset has steadily dwindled to a point where less
than 5 percent of all U.S. oceanborne foreign commerce is
carried in U.S.-flag merchant ships, and the ability of
the merchant marine to support U.S. forces in times of
overseas crisis is seriously questioned by Defense Depart-
ment officials. Whether the U.S. flag merchant marine
will disappear with the completeness of the wild pidgeon
remains to be seen. In all likelihood it will not; but
clearly there is a need for the merchant marine to fill
a more equitable and proportionate role in the carriage
of this country's foreign commerce.
The purpose of this paper is to identify, with
particular emphasis on federal maritime policy, the
reasons why the merchant marine and maritime industry of
the United States have so dramatically declined in
size, capacity, and competitiveness in recent years.
Current and proposed government policy, particularly
that of the Reagan Administration, will be examined
3along with viewpoints of representative maritime industry
sectors to assess the prospects for solving the problems
that plague the merchant marine. Finally, recommendations
will be offered which are considered most likely to
improve the vitality of the merchant marine.
The subject of this paper is the active U.S.-flag
merchant marine, that fleet of liners, tramps, bulk-car-
riers and tankers owned and operated by American citizens,
registered in the United States, and employed in inter-
national commerce. Though constituting nearly one half
of the total number of active merchant vessels under the
U.S. flag, the coastwise, intercoastal, and noncontiguous
merchant fleet is not discussed at length because it
operates under the aegis of strict cabotage laws, and is
thus shielded from the competitive forces which have so
seriously plagued the merchant marine in international
trade. The much larger U.S.-owned merchant fleet under
foreign registry which has flourished at the expense of
the U.S.-flag merchant marine is discussed as a seperate
entity in the overall problem of American maritime decline.
The U.S. shipbuilding industry, whose fortunes rise and
fall with those of the merchant marine, is an inseparable
part of this issue. Aside from the obvious interdependence
of the two, there is a regulatory bond which links the
merchant marine with shipbuilding through the federal
maritime subsidy system. As federal policy and regulations
are central to the theme of this paper,the merchant marine
4and shipbuilding will at times be referred to collectively
as the maritime industry.
The ports and infrastructure upon which maritime
commerce so vitally depend are not discussed at length
herein. Though not without problems that warrant exami-
nation and study, the port facilities of the U.S. are
shared alike by the U.S.-flag merchant marine and the
foreign merchant ships which so dominate the carriage of
American imports and exports. Problems in this area,
therefore, are not specifically contributory to the
decline of the U.S.-flag merchant fleet.
CHAPTER II
DECLINE OF THE MERCHANT MARINE
Historical Perspective
Ever since the Godspeed. Discovery and Susan
Constant brought the first permanent English settlers to
the New World in 1607. merchant shipping has been a
vital element in the growth and development of America.
Throughout colonial times shipbuilding was one of the
leading industries of the colonies. A near limitless
supply of timber and ample quantities of skilled labor
made the industry extremely competitive with its European
counterparts. and the vast majority of American imports
and exports were carried aboard American merchant ships.
This proud heritage of the American merchant marine
flourished into the early years of the Republic and
profited by some of the earliest legislation of the new
Congress. particularly with regard to cabotage laws
which reserved to American flag shipping the domain of
coastal and inland waters commerce. The power and achieve-
ments of the American merchant marine culminated in the age
of the clipper ship whose glory. previously alluded to.
flowered. then withered and vanished in a period of less
than two decades in the middle of the nineteenth century.
5
6The U.S. Civil War punctuated the demise of
American preeminence in the world of commercial shipping.
The loss of 110,000 gross tons of merchant ships sunk by
commerce raiders and 800,000 tons transferred or sold to
neutral registries during the war represented a 34 percent
reduction in the size of the fleet. This, along with
the earlier elimination of federal subsidies in 1858,
marked the beginning of a protracted decline in the
merchant marine. Its subsequent inability (or unwilling-
ness) to readily adapt to the technological innovations
of the industrial revolution-iron and steel construction
and steam propulsion - and its protracted reliance on
the wooden sailing ship well into the twentieth century
insured that the U.S. merchant marine would be a diminutive
factor in world commerce.
After the Civil War, America largely turned its
back on the sea. Both the naval and the merchant fleets
shrank to inconsequential size, and America, for all
practical purposes, ceased to be a great maritime power.
There were reasons for this beyond the failure to modernize
the fleet and capitalize on the innovations of the indus-
trial age. America's energy, manpower and investment was
devoted to the settlement and exploitation of the West.
The building of railroads and the development of new com-
munities and vast natural resources in the western states
and territories excited the imagination of the nation and
7offered far more lucrative opportunities for investment
than the moribund maritime industries of the east.
With the ultimate fulfillment of manifest destiny
the United States once again turned to the outside world
and regions across the sea where the newly developed
industrial powers of the country could find new outlets
and new sources of raw materials. The Navy experienced
a renaissance in the late 1880's and 1890's. With
spectacular victories in the War with Spain, it heralded
a new age of naval power and status for the United States.
The merchant marine, however, did not keep pace with
these developments. Early naval operations of this
period, both in the war with Spain and later during the
1906-07 world cruise of the battle fleet, relied almost
exclusively on chartered foreign merchant ships for
logistic support.
In 1855 72 percent of American foreign trade was
carried in U.S. Ships.3 By 1870 this figure had dropped
to less than 37 percent. Between 1870 and 1910 the
wealth of the country had increased sixfold, railroad
mileage four-fold, and coal production ten-fold. Over
the same interval the proportion of American exports
carried in U.S. ships dwindled to 8.7 percent. 4 This
situation precipitated an economic crisis in 1914 when
the First World War broke out in Europe. By that time
only 2 percent of the world's oceangoing merchant ships
8were under the U.S. flag. When Britain and Germany
withdrew their great merchant fleets from the American
trade the U.S. lacked the means to carry its exports in
foreign commerce. Ocean freight rates soared, insurance
rates climbed, and the prices of a record agricultural
harvest plunged because of insufficient shipping to
deliver the goods to world markets.
The dramatic achievements of the U.S. shipbuilding
industry under government mandated construction programs
during both World Wars are well known and to this day
remain unparalleled in maritime history. By 1946 the
U.S. merchant marine was once again carrying over 70
percent of U.S. foreign trade, as it had nearly a hundred
years earlier. From that peak, however, the U.S.-flag
merchant marine has steadily and inexorably declined in
numbers, in deadweight tonnage, and in its share of
participation in U.S. oceanborne foreign commerce.
Current Status
Assessing the health of the merchant marine is a
many faceted problem which is highly dependent on the
viewpoint of the observer and the segment(s) of the indus-
try which one chooses to examine. The liner fleet, for
instance, which is highly automated and largely inter-
modal operates with a modicum of competitiveness and
profitability. The huge U.S.-owned fleet under foreign
registry mainfests extensive U.S. corporate activity in
9the world of ocean shipping. Disregarding the latter
factor, however, there are several stark statistical
realities which underscore the serious state of decline
into which the merchant marine has fallen.
The United States is the greatest trading nation
in the world today in terms of tonnage and value of
imports and exports. Its high standard of living and
insular position in the world relative to sources of raw
materials and markets for exported goods necessitates a
vast foreign trade. Ninety-six percent of this trade is
carried in ships, but by 1980 only 3.7 percent of this
amount was being carried by ships flying the U.S. flag.
Table 1 illustrates the proportion of American shipping
engaged in oceanborne trade to and from United States
ports.
TABLE 1
U.S. OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE (1980)
TONNAGE (millions)
U.S. FLAG U.S. FLAG
TONS TONS PERCENT
Liner 59.3 16.2 27. 3
Non-Liner 356.7 4. 1 1.2
Tankers 356.3 7.9 2.2
Total 772. 3 28.2 3.7
10
TABLE I - Continued
DOLLAR VALUE (billions)
Liner
Non-Liner
Tankers
Total
VALUE
136.9
74.1
83.3
294.3
U.s. FLAG
VALUE
39.2
1.3
1.8
42.3
U.s. FLAG
PERCENT
28.7
1.8
2.1
14.4
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Transportation t Maritime
Administration t MARAD '81 (Washington t D.C.: Govern~ent
Printing Office t 1982)t p. 19 t table 12.
In the perspective of the previous twenty years
the figures for 1980 represent a modest increase over the
average annual U.S.-flag carriage of approximately 26.8
million tons. During the same interval t however t the
total tonnage carried by all countries in the U.S. trade
increased steadily from 277.9 million tons in 1960 to the
772.2 million tons shown for 1980 t a 178 percent increase.
The overall result is that the proportion of U.S. trade
tonnage carried in U.S. flag ships has steadily eroded
from 11.1 percent in 1960 to a mere 3.7 percent in 1980.
(See Figure 1.) SimilarlYt the U.S.-flag share of the
total value of cargoes carried in the U.S. trade has
dropped by nearly one half from 26.4 percent in 1960 to
14.4 percent in 1980. Although the value of U.S. flag
cargoes increased dramatically from 6.5 to 42.3 billion
dollars in the past two decades, the total value of
-- - ------------- - - -------------------
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foreign trade increased by a factor of twelve from 24.7
to 294.3 billion dollars.5 (See Figure 2). As illus-
trated in Figures 3a and 3b, the percentage of U.S.
trade in value and tonnage carried by U.S.-flag ships
has continually declined throughout the past three decades.
The U.S. participation in the non-liner and tanker
trade is even more dismal than in the foreign trade as a
whole. U.s. non-liners, including bulk carriers and
tramps accounted for only 1.2 percent of this trade in
1980. U.s. tankers only carried 2.2 percent of oil and
liquid cargo imports and exports. As of 1 January 1981
the U.S.-flag merchant marine operated only 48 bulk
carriers (tankers and dry bulk) in the foreign trades,
ranking twenty-third in the world in this category.
The U.S. is in a position where it must rely almost
completely on foreign flag shipping and U.S.-owned ship-
ping under foreign registry to provide the essential raw
materials needed to sustain the American economy and
standard of living. Both of these fleets operate beyond
the jurisdiction of federal laws, and will be uncertain
support in time of national emergency or war.
12
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The size of the merchant marine in terms of both
number and capacity of U.S.-flag ships has also declined
dramatically since World War II and is another disturbing
indicator of the ebbing of American maritime power since
that time. The following table shows the relative rank-
ing of the U.S. merchant marine with respect to the
world's other leading maritime nations.
TABLE 2
MAJOR MERCHANT FLEETS OF THE WORLD (JAN 1 , 1981)
No. of Rank Deadweight Rank
Country Ships by No. Tons by Tons
Liberia 2,271 4 153,242,000 1
Greece 2,928 1 69,559,000 2
Japan 1 , 762 5 62,001,000 3
United Kingdom 1,056 6 42,302,000 4
Norway 616 10 38,575,000 5
Panama 2,437 3 38,011,000 6
USSR 2,530 2 21,757,000 7
United States 578 11 21,103,000 8
France 345 18 19,539,000 9
Italy 622 8 17,269,000 10
Spain 509 12 12,235,000 1 1
West Germany 473 13 11,803,000 12
Singapore 622 9 11,754,000 13
China (PRC)
India
All others
695
370
7,053
16
7
17
10,129,000
9,221,000
116,249,000
14
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Source: u.S. Department of Transportation,
Administration, MARAD '81 (Washington, D.C.:
Printing Office, 1982), p. 17, Table 11.
Maritime
Government
As can be seen, the U.S.-flag merchant fleet has
sunk from an overall position of supremacy after World
War II to positions of eighth in tonnage and eleventh in
total numbers of ships in 1981. Nearly half of the number
of ships and deadweight tonnage shown on the previous page
for the United States is accounted for by ships engaged
in the U.S. coastwise, intercoastal and noncontiguous
domestic trades, and thus is not subject to international
competition.
The decline of the merchant marine is chronicled
in terms of men and jobs as well as ships and tonnage.
Over 35,000 seafaring jobs have disappeared since 1967,
a 65 percent reduction in employment of American officers,
seamen and engineers on U.S. ships.6 (See Figure 4)
Part of this job loss is attributable to increased auto-
mation of ships and the replacement of labor-intensive
breakbulk cargo carriers with more efficient intermodal
vessels. A major portion of the decline in employment,
however, is due to the disappearance of the ships them-
selves.
55
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Fig ure 4 : OCEANGOING SHIPBOARD JOBS : Monthly Average
( " 1000 )
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Source' Maritime Administration Annual Reports and Fact Sheets
CHAPTER III
IMPORTANCE OF THE MERCHANT MARINE
Why is a U.S.-flag merchant marine necessary in
foreign commerce? There are three general reasons:
national security, economic strength, and political
influence.
National Security
The role of the merchant marine in national
security is two-fold. First, it can operate in direct
support of military operations in far-flung parts of the
globe by transporting the thousands of troops and millions
of tons of fuel and supplies necessary to sustain military
operations overseas. Admiral Hayward, former Chief of
Some scenarios envision the direct use
Naval Operations, has stated that without adequate and
reliable sealift none of our military plans is executable
since more than 90 percent of all wartime cargo would have
7
to go by sea.
of merchantmen as naval auxiliaries. The Navy's Arapaho
Project i s an example of how a container ship can be
rapidly converted into use to carry helicopters and VSTOL
. f 8a~rcra t. Modern intermodel vessels such as the roll-on/
roll-off (Ro/Ro) ships and the LASH (lighter aboard ship)
18
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and SeaBee (barge carrier) ships are readily adaptable
for landing heavy equipment such as tanks and armored
vehicles during amphibious operations or at poorly
developed or damaged ports.
In its secondary security role the U.S.-flag
merchant marine would be depended upon to carry the
strategic materials which are vital to sustaining indust-
rial production as well as the transportation systems of
the United States in either a maritime or peacetime
crisis.
If World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam
War do not provide sufficient examples of how vital a
large and capable merchant marine is to carrying out
military operations, the Falkland Island War waged between
the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982 should serve as
an excellent example of the valuable and versatility of
a flag merchant marine in time of crisis. Britain was
able to rapidly commandeer and convert a broad spectrum
of ships from her merchant fleet (still the world's
fourth largest) to military roles. Oceanliners pressed
into service as troopships, channel ferries into amphibious
ships, fishing trawlers into minesweepers, a container
ship into an aircraft carrier, as well as tankers and
general cargo ships, bolstered a small naval task force
and helped Britain win a decisive military and political
victory over 8,000 miles from home base. Whether the
20
U.S.-flag merchant marine could meet this type of challenge
today remains problematical. Whether reliable support
could be expected under similar circumsta nces f ro m the
nearly 700 U.S. owned ships operating under foreign
registry, with foreign masters and crews is also an
. 9
uncerta1nty.
Economics
There is also an economic imperative for operating
a U.S.-flag merchant marine. The United States is the
world's greatest trading nation, yet 96.3 percent of all
cargoes (in 1980) were carried by ships registered in
foreign countries. This is clearly out of proportion
when compared to the percentage of other country's
foreign trade carried in their respective flag ships.
Other major nations of the developed world, all of whom
are less dependent than the United States on seaborne
commerce carry between 30 and 70 percent of their trade
in their own ships as illustrated in the following
examples. 10
Country Percent of Tonnage (1977)
USSR 50
China (PRC) 70
Greece 45
Japan 39
Norway 37
Spain
United Kingdom
West Germany
France
United States
21
37
34
30
30
5
From these figures it can be deduced that the U.S.
flag merchant marine should be carrying at least five
times as much cargo as at present. That it doesn't is
not an indication of a chronic lack of patiotism among
American shippers, but it is a clear indication that the
U.S.-flag merchant marine lacks the competitiveness to
assume its "rightful" status in the world of international
commerce. In a highly competitive market shippers will move
their cargoes, unless otherwise constrained, on ships pro-
viding the best service at the least cost.
Every ton of cargo carried in the U.S. trade that
is not carried in American flag-ships represents an
economic loss to the United States in the balance of pay-
ments. In 1979 total payments to foreign flag ship
operators exceeded receipts by U.S.-flag 0 pQrators by
$4.07 billion.1 1 Cargo tariffs go to foreign owners and
wages to foreign crews. The federal government loses tax
revenues and American seafarers lose jobs. Additionally,
the demand for ships and nautical equipment and supplies
remains low. Shipbuilders and suppliers to the maritime
22
industry lose potential business, and in many cases go
out of business altogether.
Political Influence
The political influence of the merchant marine
in the socio-economic struggle between East and West
cannot be discarded. It plays an important role in
introducing the national flag into all corners of the
globe, exporting ideas as well as products, gathering
intelligence and foreign exchange as well as raw mater-
ials, food and fuel. The advantages of this aspect of
merchant shipping have not been lost on the Soviet Union
which virtually doubled the size of its merchant fleet
between 1960 and 1980, while the U.S. allowed its fleet
to wither away.
CHAPTER IV
u.s. MARITIME POLICY
The importance of a strong national merchant
marine, equal to the demands of the country's foreign
trade and commerce, has been thoroughly appreciated by
succeeding administrations ever since the beginning of
World War 1. Elaborate systems of subsidy, financial
aid and regulations intended to build, promote and main-
tain a strong merchant marine have been employed since
1916. The policy of the federal government towards the
merchant marine has been no more clearly stated than in
the preamble to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, regarded
by some as the Magna Carta of the maritime industry, and
which remains to this day the basis for federal maritime
12policy:
It is necessary for the national defense
and development of its foreign and domestic
commerce that the United States shall have
a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its
domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial
portion of the waterborne export and import
foreign commerce of the United States and to
provide shipping service essential for maintaining
the flow of such domestic and foreign waterborne
commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving as a
naval and military auxiliary in time of war or
national emergency, (c) owned and operated under
the United States flag by citizens of the United
States, insofar as may be practicable, (d) composed
of the best equipped, safest, and most suitable
23
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types of vessels, constructed in the United States
and manned with a trained and efficient citizen
personnel, and (e) supplemented by efficient facili-
ties for shipbuilding and ship repair. It is declared
to be the policy of the United States to foster the
development and encourage the maintenance of such a
merchant marine. 1 3
Notwithstanding the remarkable growth of the
merchant fleet in World War II, this federal policy
toward the merchant marine has failed to achieve in more
than a minimal way its intended results. Maritime Admini-
strator H.E. Shear reporting in MARAD '81 the annual
report of the Maritime Administration for 1981, has said:
The status of the industry at that date was
not good. Government programs conducted
under the basic 1936 act and expanded and
improved under the Merchant Marine Act of
1970 - all launched with high hopes - had
failed to stem the industry's df(line. A
change of course was necessary.
There are many causes for this, and some of them are
directly attributable to the very regulatory and support
system which was legislated to promote the vitality of
the maritime industry. A brief survey of the government
regulatory and support system follows.
The Shipping Act of 1916 (as amended)
The 1916 Act was intended to assert government
control over competition-limiting practices which were
frequently used by members of common carrier liner confer-
ences. Under the Act, liner conferences operating on
- -- ------------- - ------------------..,
25
u.s. trade routes must publish rates, rules, and conditions
of service in tariffs filed with the Federal Maritime
Commission (FMC) and make them available to the public.
Advance public notice of tariff changes shall be made
which the FMC may disapprove if the provisions of the Act
are violated or the public interest is not served.
Conference members are permitted to fix rates; regulate
or prevent competition; pool or apportion earnings,
losses, or traffic; restrict or regulate the number and
frequency of sailings between ports; limit or regulate
the volume and character of freight to be carried; and,
subject to approval by the FMC, provide for exclusive,
preferential, or cooperative working arrangements which
are exempt from application of u.s. anti-trust laws.
The 1916 Act also specifically prohibited such
competition inhibiting conference practices as deferred
rebates to retain shipper patronage; "fighting ships" to
drive independent competition out of the trade route;
discrimination against shippers as punishment for non-
patronage; and unjust or unfair discrimination against
shippers.
The Merchant Marine Acts of 1920 and 1928 further
established the role of government in regulating trade
routes, providing contruction loans, allowing tax deferred
construction funds, and providing for operational subsidies
(in the form of mail contracts) to promote parity between
26
u.s. and foreign shipbuilding and operating costs.
Section 27 of the 1920 Act is the important cabotage
provision of U.S. maritime policy which establishes the
coastwise and intercoastal trade as the exclusive pre-
serve of U.S.-flag shipping, effectively eliminating
foreign competition on these routes. Principles of
government support and regulation established in the
1920 and 1928 Acts became part of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936 which, as amended by the Merchant Marine Act
of 1970, is the basis of the federal policy towards the
merchant marine today.
The Tariff Act of 1922 introduced the 50 percent
ad valorem tax on all repairs, parts and equipment pur-
chased abroad for U.S.-registered ships. This measure
remains in effect today and imposes a significant element
of inflexibility and expense on U.S.-flag ship operations.
Merchant Marine Act of 1936
The 1936 Act reaffirmed the need for a privately
owned U.S. flag merchant marine and committed the federal
government to a system of direct and indirect financial
contributions which were intended to ensure its vitality.
Major elements of the Act which were designed to promote
the construction and competitive operation of a U.S.-flag
merchant marine include:
27
1. The Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS) is
a direct subsidy intended to offset the difference
between ship construction ship costs in a foreign and U.S.
shipyard. Limited to a ceiling of 50 percent of the cost
of a new vessel, CDS is supposed to encourage and assist
U.S. ship owners to build their vessels in U.S. shipyards.
Such vessels are obliged to remain under U.S. registry for
twenty-five years and are to be operated exclusively in
the foreign trade of the U.S. The plans for vessels built
with CDS must also be approved by the Secretary of the Navy
to ensure they are suitable for rapid conversion to naval
auxiliaries. Ships built under CDS are eligible to operate
with the Operating Differential Subsidy.
2. The Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS) is a
direct subsidy intended to offset the difference in
operational cost incurred by a U.S. owner operating his
ship under U.S. registry as compared to operating the
same ship under foreign registry. ODS payments are made
to cover the cost of crew wages, hull and machinery
insurance, maintenance and repairs, and protection and
indemnity insurance. Recipients of ODS must build their
ships in U.S. yards. Temporary authority, since expired,
was granted for ODS recipients to build aboard after the
1981 Omnibus Budger Reconciliation Act eliminated the
construction differential subsidy.
u.s.
28
3. The Capital Construction Fund (CCF) entitles
flag ship operators to invest earnings from operation
and sale of their ships in a tax deferred fund which may
only be used for the purchase of U.S. flag vessels built
in U.S. shipyards.
4. The Title XI Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance is
a loan guarantee provided by the government to lenders of
funds utilized for building U.S. flag ships in U.S. ship-
yards. The government will guarantee loans for up to 75
percent of the ships built with CDS funds and 87.5 percent
of the cost of nonsubsidized ships.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970
The 1970 Act amended the 1936 Act and reaffirmed
its policy and objectives. The 1970 Act fine tuned some
Major
of the entitlements of the Merchant Marine Act to promote
greater growth in the shipbuilding industry and greater
U.S. flag participation in the dry bulk trades.
provisions of the Act include:
1. A long-term government committment to revitalize
the shipbuilding industry was made to encourage investment
and modernization of U.S. shipyards. The government pro-
posed to support the construction of 300 merchant ships
over a ten year period.
2. Granting CDS funds directly to shipyards rather
than shipowners was authorized to promote shipyard partici-
pation in vessel designs. and to promote greater efficiency
and economy in ship construction.
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3. Competitive bidding procedures between ship
purchaser and shipbuilder were replaced by negotiated
contracting. The intent was to streamline contracting
procedures and encourage yards to develop and market
standard vessel designs.
4. Declining CDS payments were mandated starting
with a 45 percent ceiling in FY 1971 declining 2 percent
per year until FY 1976 at which point the maximum ceiling
would remain at 35 percent of construction cost. (The
ceiling was subsequently raised to 50 percent due to a
slumping market for new ships and increased foreign ship-
building competition.)
5. ODS payments t previously restricted to liners t
were extended to U.S built tankers and dry bulk carriers
in an effort to encourage U.S.-flag participation in the
bulk trades.
6. U.S. owners were permitted to use ODS funding
for dry bulk vessels to encourage phased replacement of
their foreign-built bulkers with tonnage built in U.S.
shipyards.
7. Subsidized bulkers were authorized to operate
in foreign-to-foreign trade routes while retaining their
operating subsidy.
8. A new system of wage indexing was adopted to
minimize increases in ODS expenditures and encourage
owners to bargain for better wage settlements than had
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been obtained from unions in the past. Wage increases
beyond the index would not be covered by ODS funding.
9. Capital Construction Fund (CCF) entitlements
were extended to all operators of U.S. ships in the
foreign, noncontiguous domestic, or Great Lakes trade or
in the fisheries.
10. A Construction Reserve Fund (CRF) was formed
so that owners could invest the proceeds from the sale of
their vessel, indemnities from losses of vessels, and
earnings from operations without incurring a tax liability.
Funds were to be used for financing construction of
replacement vessels in U.S. shipyards for use in any U.S.
trade route, including domestic inland and intercoastal.
From the implementation of the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936 through FY 1981 the federal government has expended
a total of $9,704,805,160 in direct subsidy payments to
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U.S.-flag ship operators and shipbuilders. Since the
passage of the 1970 Act, combined subsidy outlays have
averaged nearly $500,000,000 per annum. Inspite of this
massive federal support, the proportion of U.S. trade
carried in U.S.-flag ships has continued to dwindle, and
very little success has been achieved in bringing dry
bulk operation under the U.S. flag. In the following
sections the apparent causes for this failure will be
further explored.
CHAPTER V
CAUSES OF MARITIME DECLINE
The causes of the decline of the U.S.-flag merchant
marine are many and varied. its problems multifaceted. and
the solutions obscured by a diversity of special interests.
Almost all parties involved - those who contribute to the
formulation of American maritime policy. build the ships
and those who operate the fleet itself - have contributed
in some way to the demise of the merchant marine. Evolving
changes in the international regulatory and trade environ-
ment and the maritime industry's inability to adapt to
those changes have also contributed significantly to the
diminishing competitiveness of the U.S.-flag merchant
marine in foreign commerce.
Lack of Coherent Policy
The U.S. maritime industry suffers severely from the
lack of a clear national maritime policy and goals. The
Maritime Administration (MARAD). now under the Department
of Transportation. has principal promotional and admini-
strative jurisdiction over the merchant marine. and six
other cabinet level departments encompassing fourteen
government agencies have jurisdiction over. or important
31
roles in,
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the maritime activities of the United States.
Special interest groups are well represented by twenty-five
maritime trade associations, five marine industry related
associations, twenty-one seafaring labor unions, five
shipyard labor unions. two longshoreman unions, five labor
organizations, nine independent tanker unions, and two
f a r I i' 17sea r1ng assoc at10ns. These organizations, as well
as environmental and consumer groups, and foreign shipping
interests send a veritable army of lobbiests to the
nation's capitol to help Congress hammer out maritime
policy. Even the industry itself is severely fragmented
in viewpoint and can offer Congress no concensus of what is
best for the industry. not to mention what is best for the
country. Tankers and liners are represented by two dif-
ferent lobbying groups. The American Institute of Mer-
chant Shipping (AIMS) represents two-thirds of the tanker
operators and the American Maritime Association (AMA)
represents the remaining third. The Council of American-
Flag Ship Operators (CASO) represents the subsidized liner
fleet, while Sea-Land represents itself as the sole non-
subsidized liner operator. The Federation of American
Controlled Shipping represents U.S. owners of ships under
18
open registries.
These myriad and diverse viewpoints have made it
difficult for Congress to articulate through legislation
a coherent maritime policy. The recent 95th, 96th, and
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97th Congresses held extensive hearings on proposed
revisions to U.S. maritime policy but failed to produce
significant legislation. The proposed Maritime Regulatory
Act of 1982 (H.R.4374/S.1593)~ the most important piece of
legislation to promote the merchant marine since the 1970
Act~ took thirteen months to be passed by the House~ but
ultimately foundered in the Senate in the face of a fili-
buster threat by Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) during
the 1982 lame-duck session of Congress. This type of
abuse~ coupled with the traditional opposition of the
powerful Judiciary Committee to any maritime measures
which involve easing of anti-trust policy~ has hindered
Congress' ability to produce legislation favorable to
the liner industry. As long as Congress~ as well as the
cognizant federal agencies involved in maritime policy~
continue to subordinate the common good of the country
to the divergent special interests of their constituents
in the fragmented maritime industry~ maritime policy will
continue to drift and the shipping and shipbuilding
industry will continue to stagnate and decline. The
federal government role in this process is further illumi-
nated in the following sections discussing the causes of
the demise of the merchant marine.
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Failure of Direct Subsidies
The direct subsidy provisions of the 1936 Merchant
Marine Act which were intended to support the growth and
operation of a strong merchant fleet have in the long term
contributed to its demise through competition-inhibiting
regulatory stipulations. The operational differential
subsidy (ODS) is designed to offset the extra cost of
operating a merchant vessel under U.S. registry over what
a similar vessel would cost to operate under foreign
registry. The principle element in this cost differential
is wages, which on U.S.-flag ships are typically two to
three times greater than on a European flag ship. Theo-
retically the operating subsidy should allow the U.S.
ship operator to compete on an equal footing with foreign
operators. In actuality ODS has hurt the competitiveness
of the merchant marine because it has linked ship operators
to the foundering and non-competitive U.S. shipbuilding
industry, subjected operators to lengthy and costly bureau-
cratic procedures which have impaired operational flexi-
bility, and dulled any sense of urgency that operators may
have had in dealing firmly with excessive labor union
demands or seeking manpower reduction on their vessels.
Until 1981 when the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
act eliminated construction differential subsidies (CDS),
operators receiving ODS were required to build their
ships in U.S. shipyards. Additionally, repair and
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maintenance work was required to be performed in U.S.
yards. The CDS was originally intended to promote
competition and expand the U.S.-built merchant fleet by
offsetting the extra cost involved in building in a
domestic yard rather than a foreign shipyard. In the
long term this has not kept the u.S. shipbuilding industry
in a competitive position. More recently the 50 percent
statutory limit on CDS payments for construction of a
vessel in a U.S. yard has been insufficient to achieve
cost parity with foreign shipyards.
A study conducted for the Shipbuilders Council of
America by Data Resources, Inc. in October 1979 highlighted
the inadequacy of CDS payments by comparing costs for
building various types of ships in U.S. and Japanese
yards. The table below indicates how much subsidy (as
a percentage of U.S. costs) would be required to achieve
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cost-parity for the U.S. builder:
Type
Vessel
Required
Subsidy
C-8
Container
Ship
57%
32,000 dwt
Dry Bulker
63%
125,000m3
LNG
36%
80,000 dwt
Tanker
61%
As can be seen, the ODS operator who is compelled by regu-
lation to "buy American" will find he must pay higher
prices for newly built U.S. ships, even with the CDS, than
he would if he bought abroad. With the suspension of CDS
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by the Reagan Administration. U.S. operators have received
relief from this costly dilemma by being permitted to
build abroad in less expensive foreign shipyards. The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35)
authorized U.S. operators to build abroad through 30
September 1982 without losing their ODS eligibility. The
build abroad provision has not. however. been renewed by
Congress.
The example of two U.S. liner companies illustrates
the economic disadvantages incurred by operators who remain
tied to the ODS-CDS regulations. Sea-Land, Inc. planned
to build twelve diesel powered containerships for its
fleet. The estimated cost in U.S. shipyards was $80
million each. With CDS the cost to Sea-Land would have
been $40 million each if built in U.S. yards. As the same
vessels could be built in Japanese and Korean shipyards for
only $30 million each, Sea-Land decided to build overseas.
Not being tied to an ODS contract, Sea-Land was able to do
so. American President Lines, Ltd. (APL), a subsidized
U.S. liner company, bought three container ships priced at
$90 million each in U.S. shipyards. The CDS paid for 49.98
percent of the cost leaving APL with over $45 million per
ship to finance. APL estimated that this is at least $13
million more per ship than it would have cost to build
overseas. Being tied to U.S. construction by ODS contract,
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APL was thus "penalized" in this case for nearly $40 million.
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A further disadvantage incurred by the ODS-induced
requirement to build in domestic yards is the operational
inflexibility that results from the greater amount of time
it takes to construct a ship in a U.S. shipyard. The
example cited above illustrates the point. Sea-Land
received delivery of the first of its twelve container
ships from Far Eastern yards within fifteen months. The
remaining eleven were delivered at one month intervals
thereafter. Total time from contract to last delivery:
twenty-four months. APL received delivery on the first
of its three container ships in thirty months. The
remaining two were delivered at three month intervals.
Total time from contract to delivery:
thirty-six months. Sea-Land was able to acquire four times
as many ships in 33 percent less time than its subsidized
competitor, American President Lines. Besides the
increased financing charges resulting from the longer con-
tract time, the subsidized operator enjoys less ability to
take timely action to modernize his fleet to exploit
emergent or changing business opportunities, and thus
experiences another competitive disadvantage with respect
to his non-subsidized U.S. and foreign competitors.
Other regulatory obligations of the operating and con-
struction differential subsidies serve to restrict the
flexibility of U.S.-flag ship operations.
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In the liner trades, U.S.-flag ships operating
under ODS are required to operate in government-designated
essential U.S. trade routes (ETR's). This rule is designed
to ensure the presence of U.S.-flag ships on routes tra-
ditionally deamed essential to U.S. economic security, and
to prevent direct competition between subsidized ships on
the same routes. This concept, however, introduces an
element of operational inflexibility for the U.S. operator
because proposed changes of service on an ETR must receive
prior approval from the Maritime Administration. A
lengthy review process makes it difficult for a liner
operator to adjust his service to take advantage of
opportune trade advantages as readily as foreign competi-
21
tors can.
A ship's owner's acceptance of ODS invites govern-
ment intrusion into basic financial and management
decisions of the company. MARAD consent is required to pay
dividends, increase employee compensation, transfer funds
to stockholders, transfer control of vessels, and increase
indebtedness. Additionally, the shipowner must replace
his subsidized vessels after twenty-five years with new
U.S.-built vessels which inevitably will cost more to con-
struct and take longer to deliver than similar vessels
built in foreign shipyards.
If drawing maintenance and repair (M&R) subsidy
payments under ODS, the U.S. ship operator is also
- -----~-----------------------------__z
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compelled to have all repair and maintenance work performed
22in U.S. yards. This penalty and the 50 percent M&R Tariff
are features unique to U.S. maritime policy which impose
upon U.S. flag ship operators an additional financial and
operational burden not shared by their foreign competitors.
The purpose of these provisions was to promote ship repair
business in U.S. shipyards by requiring all U.S. flag
ships to have all non-emergency repairs performed in
domestic yards. In conforming with this provision a ship
operator would be giving up the operational flexibility
to have repairs performed in the most convenient and
economical yard, regardless of whether foreign or domestic,
to minimize the impact on his ship's operating schedule.
U.S.-flag ships which sometimes work the cross trades, are
particularly disadvantaged because they would have to
leave their trade routes and make often long and profitless
return voyages to the U.S. The impact of not complying
with this requirement is severe. Non-subsidized flag
ships who obtain non-emergency repairs in foreign yards
must pay a 50 percent tariff on the cost of repairs to
U.S. Customs. Subsidized U.S.-flag operators who choose
to have repairs performed overseas are in addition assessed
a penalty equal to the cost of repairs which is deducted
from their ODS payment. Foreign flag ships, on the other
hand, are able to have maintenance and repair work performed
at the most convenient and economical shipyards available.
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In the fiercely competitive tanker and bulk trade,
the U.S. flag fleet has not done well, carrying less than
2.5 percent of the non-liner bulk and liquid cargo tonnage
carried in the U.S. foreign trade in 1980. The 1970
Merchant Marine Act tried to boost the competitiveness of
the U.S. flag tankers and bulk carriers by extending ODS
payments to this segment of the fleet. However, Article
804 of the Act effectively negated any incentive for U.S.
tanker or bulk operators to take advantage of the subsidy
because of the stipulation which would have frozen their
operations of foreign flag vessels. Article 804 requires
operators receiving an ODS to divest themselves and their
subsidiaries of their foreign flag operations by 1990.
This has thus far failed to entice U.S. citizen tanker and
bulk operators to return to the U.S. flag.
The very operators at which this provision was
aimed are predominantly the large U.S.-based energy and
natural resource corporations and their subsidiaries who
operate collectively a merchant fleet under foreign regis-
tries which far exceeds the combined size and tonnage of
the U.S. flag merchant marine. For any of these companies
to have returned to the U.S. flag would have necessitated
relinquishing these extensive and generally profitable
23
operations.
In accepting government subsidies, U.S. ship
operators have thus in many instances been bridled with
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costly bureaucratic disincentives. They have sacrificed
considerable latitude for making independent financial and
operational decisions which could otherwise promote
efficiences and opportunities for profit.
Lack of Efficiency
A lack of overall operating efficiency has con-
tributed significantly to the non-competitiveness of the
u.s. flag merchant fleet. The bottom line of merchant
ship efficiency is cost per space mile or cost per ton
mile. This is a function of fuel cost, operating cost,
and capital costs. In the case of liner shipping U.S.
cost per space mile is estimated at 12-15 cents. Foreign
liner vessels operating in U.S. trades are estimated to
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operate at 7-10 cents per space mile.
Most of the ships in the U.S. liner fleet fail to
measure up because of the excessive age, less efficient
power plants, and insufficient size to obtain optimum
economies of scale.
A significant cost advantage is lost by not employing
low speed diesel engines for propulsion. Diesels are 30-40
percent more fuel efficient than steam turbines. In spite
of the high cost of fuel, which next to the crew is the
highest component of total vessel operating costs, U.S.
ship operators have been slow to adopt this method of
propulsion, and 90 percent of U.S. liners remain propelled
by steam. Because of the "buy American" provisions of the
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CDS contracts, and the slowness of u.S. industry to
gear up to the production of large slow-speed marine
diesels, ships constructed in U.S. yards still employed
steam turbines long after foreign yards switched to
diesel. This extra built-in operating cost puts U.S.
ships at another comparative disadvantage in this respect. 2 5
Using 500-600 FEU's (1000-1200 TEU's) as a minimal
benchmark cargo capacity for competitive operations
approximately 60 percent of the ships in the U.S. fleet
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are too small to compete effectively in foreign commerce.
Older vessels are also more likely to experience higher
maintenance and repair costs, higher wage costs, greater
fuel consumption per cargo capacity, and less efficient
cargo handling facilities which necessitates
turn-around times in port.
longer
Significantly, the non-subsidized segment of the
U.S. liner industry has fared much better than the fleet
as a whole. All non-subsidized vessels are containerized,
whereas only one third of the subsidized vessels are con-
tainerized. Only three subsidized ships utilize diesel
propulsion, whereas 16 non-subsidized ships use diesels.
Sea-Land, Inc., the only non-government subsidized operator
captured 34 percent of the total U.S. liner earnings
revenues during the period 1978-81. Non-subsidized liner
operations earned $475 million (before taxes), while the
rest of the liner fleet, all of which is subsidized, earned
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$550 million (after subsidy). If subsidy payments were
deducted, a loss of $600 million would have been exper-
ienced by the subsidized industry.27 The non-subsidized
operators were disadvantaged by receiving no operating-
differential subsidy payments to offset crew costs. How-
ever, by being free from the regulatory obligations tied
to the acceptance of ODS and CDS, Sea-Land was able to
purchase large, modern and efficient ships from foreign
yards to use in an operational environment less hindered
by federal regulation and supervision. The fact that Sea-
Land is the only one of nine remaining U.S. liner operators
to operate without direct government subsidy, and the only
one of those companies to regularly clear a profit, is an
ironic condemnation of the subsidy system which has
attempted to promote the merchant marine over the past
forty-seven years. Though critics would attempt to miti-
gate the contrast by pointing to the strong financial
backing Sea-Land has in its parent company, R.J. Reynolds
Industries, there can be little doubt that R.J. Reynolds
would not tolerate its shipping subsidiary for long if the
bottom line did not show a profit.
argue with success.
Crew Costs
It is difficult to
The cost of manning U.S.-flag ships is a principal
cause of non-competitiveness in the operation of ships in
the U.S. merchant marine. The requirement of the Merchant
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Marine Act that U.S.-flag ships must be manned by U.S.
citizens~ and the fact that American merchant seamen
receive greater wage and benefit payments than those of
any other maritime country are directly responsible for
this problem.
Crew costs are between two and three times greater
on a U.S.-flag ship than for a similar ship of foreign
registry. Mr. Eugene Yourch~ speaking for the Federation
of American Controlled Shipping (FACS)~ has stated that
1981 crew costs on a U.S. merchant vessel with a 32-man
crew computed to over $3~000~000 compared with $1~300~000
for a 32-man Italian crew on the same type vessel.
for a Spanish crew of the same size would only be
Costs
28$1~050~000. Individual wages for U.S. seafarers range
from $20~000 for the lowest rank seaman to $150~000 a
year for ship's masters. The average work year for U.S.
merchant mariners is six months; thus for a vessel operator
to keep his ships employed throughout the year~ it would
cost him $300~000 per billet for the master with similarly
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doubled costs down through the vessel's payscale.
Base wage and overtime wage costs represent 50%
of crew costs on U.S. ships. Pension contributions~
medical and welfare benefits~ shipboard lodging and
subsistance~ standby crew costs~ transportation expendi-
tures~ training costs~ and protection and indemnity
insurance comprise the balance of the U.S. crew costs
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and the generous compensation package afforded U.S.
i f h e I . 30mar ners or t e1r serV1ce.
Adding to the crew cost factor in U.S. vessel
operation is the fact that manning requirements for U.S.
flag ships exceed those of foreign competition. U.S.
operators claim they are forced to carry as much as 25
percent larger crews than are actually required to
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efficiently operate their ships.
Crew costs clearly represent the major portion of
the ODS payments made to subsidized U.S. operators and are
the primary reason that operating-differential subsidies
are needed to achieve operational cost parity with foreign
competitors. In FY 1982 the government spent $417 million
dollars on ODS, $354.6 million (85 percent) of which went
on
to pay for wage subsidies - an average of $61,282 for each
subsidized U.S. flag ships.32of 5,786 employees
The failure of U.S. maritime policy is apparent in
this important area of merchant ship operations. The U.S.
citizen manning requirement of the 1936 Act which was
intended to ensure U.S. citizen participation in the
seafaring trades has, in conjunction with ODS payments,
contributed to the decline of both the merchant marine
and seagoing jobs for U.S. mariners by fostering a compe-
tition-stifling labor environment. Because the differ-
ence in labor and other operational costs of U.S. ships
over similar foreign competitors is passed directly on
The labor unions themselves have
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to the government via ODS, operators have not felt a
competitive imperative to pursue tougher positions in
labor contract negotiations and they have failed to
press more vigorously for labor saving technology and
33
reduced crew sizes.
participated equally with government and industry in
mismanagement of the industry but; as Frank Drozak, Presi-
dent of the Seafarers International Union of North America,
has admitted, maritime unions have had little reason to
compromise with operators whose operating costs are sub-
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sidized by the government.
Demise of Free Trade
All segments of the U.S. merchant marine have been
hindered in their opportunities to fill a more prominent
role in world shipping because of the philosophy of "free
trade" which has long been the under-pinning of U.S. com-
mercial policy. Stated policy and regulatory actions con-
cerning maritime commerce have largely failed to recognize
that the maritime industry operates in an international
arena which to a very great extent does not adhere to
free trade principles.
The U.S. merchant marine has been forced in essence
to compete in world trade with a different, more restrict-
ive set of rules than foreign shipping operators. Further-
O the U S trade wl· t h the exception of cargo preferencem re, • • ,
provisions applying to military, foreign aid, and other
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government agency-impelled cargos, is wide open to foreign
shipping. Bilateral shipping agreements among other
countries, and stringent foreign cargo preference rules
are gradually closing out large segments of world trade
from U.S. and other third party shipping competition.
The following examples indicate the extent to
which foreign countries have reserved unto their own
flag ships significant portions of their international
trade: Argentina, 50 percent; Brazil, 100 percent petrol-
eum, 50 percent coffee to U.S., 100 percent paper products;
Chili, 50 percent; Columbia, 50 percent general cargo,
bulk, liquid and refrigerated; France, two thirds imported
oil; India, 100 percent oil; Indonesia, 40 percent of
all cargo with Europe; Peru, 50 percent; and Spain, 100
percent imports of petroleum, tobacco and cotton. 3 5
The openness of U.S. trade to foreign competition
from state-owned East European and Soviet merchant fleets
offering cut-rate tariffs to U.S. shippers has resulted
in a further loss of market share to U.S. ship operators. 3 6
This type of competition is not impelled or sustained by
profit motive. It is an instrument of the Soviet State,
an integral part of the coordinated and centrally directed
Soviet maritime power. The chief mission of the Soviet
Merchant Marine, beyond its obvious naval and political
support role, is to penetrate western trade routes and
gather hard currency revenues in return for providing
cut-rate service.
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It was estimated by MARAD in 1977 that
85-90 percent of the growing Soviet liner fleet was
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engaged in the cross trades. Long term operations and
growth of the Soviet merchant marine clearly indicate its
objective of displacing U.S. and western shipping and
becoming the dominant carrier on world trade routes.
The implications of that development from the viewpoint
of U.S./NATO security are clearly evident. Of immediate
commercial concern, however, is that the U.S. merchant
marine which is still operated as a private enterprise,
albeit a subsidized one, cannot hope to survive and
flourish in a commercial environment rife with predatory
traders and rapidly disappearing cargo carrying opportuni-
ties.
Regulation of Liner Conferences
A constant corollary to the traditional American
advocacy of free trade has been a deeply rooted abhorrance
of any commercial activity which has the anti-competitive
characteristics of trusts or cartels. This constricted
point of view which dates back to the Sherman and Clayton
Anti-Trust Acts of the turn of the century has worked a
particular hardship on the competitiveness of the U.S.
flag liner industry.
Conferences (or cartels) of liner operators serving
a particular trade route have existed since the 1890's,
and are the commonly accepted way of controlling competition
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on all the world's major trade routes today. Conferences
typically enter agreements to fix rates and regulate
service to avoid "wasteful" competition in their trade
routes. The Shipping Act of 1916, recognizing the fact
that U.S. ocean liners operated in a world apart from
domestic business enterprise, granted them immunity from
U.S. anti-trust law to enable them to operate more effect-
ively in this fiercely competitive regime.
Certain weaknesses in the 1916 Act left U.S.
participants in the liner conferences at a comparative
disadvantage to their foreign liner conference associates.
Conferences in U.S. trade routes were required to get FMC
approval before any competition-limiting agreements could
be placed into effect. They must also prove the agreement
to be in the "public interest". Conferences could not
exclude new members or prevent them or independents from
undercutting conference rates. Other specific practices
such as rebates, fighting ships, discrimination against
shippers, and dual rates were banned.
In spite of the 1916 Act, the Justice Department,
true to its anti-trust philosophy, has interferred con-
stantly with liner regulation over the years, effectively
eroding the intentions of the Act. Speaking out on this
problem Senator Inouye in recent Senate debates on anti
trust immunity has stated:
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The Department of Justice and those who
see our anti-trust laws as ends in them-
selves have made no secrets of their
efforts over the years to destroy the con-
ference system. They have recommended
outright repeal of the Shipping Act; they
have consistently sought to render the
protections in that act meaningless by
challenging conference agreements before
the FMC and courts, and by virtually
immobilizing carrier efforts to utilize
legally authorized techniques to make
liner service efficient and dependable
at fair prices. 3 8
In 1980, for example, the Justice Department found all
North Atlantic conferences guilty of price fixing and
fined them a total of $50 million. 3 9 In 1976 Sea-Land
was required to pay a $4 million settlement for paying
rebates to shippers. 4 0 Lengthy FMC review procedures
involved in approving conference agreements and extensive
vulnerability to litigation of charged anti-trust vio-
lations have burdened the U.S. conference liner operators
with a degree of operational inflexibility and expense
not shared by foreign liners and independents in the U.S.
trade. Foreign flag liners are not subject to anti-trust
laws of their flag states and do not readily acquiesce to
anti-trust jurisdiction in U.S. law. Policing and prose-
cut ion of foreign violators is difficult, and abuses such
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as rebating continue.
Flags of Convenience
U.S.-owned ships which operate under foreign regi-
stries are said to sail under "flags of convenience," or,
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depending on one's point of view, "flags of necessity."
As of 1978, 677 ships owned principally
and resource corporations operated under
by U.S. petroleum
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foreign registry.
The role this mighty U.S.-owned merchant fleet has played
in the demise of the U.S.-flag merchant marine is widely
debated. Created during World War II and expanded rapidly
in the years since, the U.S. foreign registry fleet has
been a haven for U.S. ship owners seeking economic freedom
from U.S. labor union rules and high wages, as well as U.S.
. 431ncome taxes. This fleet has allowed U.S. shipping
interests to thrive and profit at sea in a manner no longer
possible under the U.S. flag. It has provided a reasonable
alternative to the high costs and operational inflexibility
experienced under U.S. maritime policy; and in this sense
the "flag of convenience" fleet has served not so much as a
cause, or even a symptom, but more as a catalyst to the
decline of the U.S. merchant marine.
In the preceding sections we have discussed the
long-term decline of the U.S.-flag merchant marine engaged
in foreign commerce, and the regulatory regime under which
this has taken place. We have seen how many components
of the maritime industry, labor, federal agencies, and the
Congress have played a part in diminishing American mer-
cantile seapower. In the following sections the stated
policies of the Reagan Administration toward the Merchant
Marine will be discussed along with current congressional
and administration initiatives intended to promote revival
of the maritime industry.
CHAPTER VI
FORMULATING A NEW MARITIME POLICY
Both government and industry share responsi-
bility for the recent decline of American
shipping and shipbuilding. Both government
and industry must now make a substantial
effort to reverse that record. We must
begin immediately to rebuild our merchant
fleet and make it more competitive. Accord-
ingly I am announcing today a new maritime
program for this nation. one which will
replace the drift and neglect of recent years
and restore this country to a proud ~osition
in the shipping lanes of the world. 4
- Richard Nixon
23 October 1969
The Reagan Program
Presidential Administrations have long recognized
the importance of the merchant marine to the country.
They have been equally perceptive to recognize America's
declining role in foreign maritime commerce. and eager to
pronounce optimistic programs for recovery. None so far
have succeeded in halting the decline. With the inaugu-
ration of President Reagan in January 1981. however. a
new political philosphy has come into being which is
substantially different in its view of government's role
in business and enterprise than any other since the New
Deal of the 1930's. This fresh outlook. plus a strong
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committment to national defense and security matters,
presages renewed hope that national maritime policy may
be reforged during this Administration.
During the 1980 presidential campaign candidate
Ronald Reagan enunciated his maritime policy. Decrying
the erosion of American maritime strength and the
resultant loss of political, economic and military influ-
ence and prestige in the preceding years, particularly
during the administration of President Carter, candidate
Reagan outlined a plan to restore America's maritime
power by revitalizing the Navy, the merchant marine, and
the shipbuilding industry.
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program follows:
A summary of the Reagan
- Establish a unified direction for all federal
agencies and programs affecting U.S. maritime
interests. Cooperation between the Navy,
merchant marine and government departments
will be established for the Navy and merchant
marine.
- Undertake sufficient naval and commercial
shipbuilding to ensure that the shipbuilding
mobilization base is preserved. A nucleus
of trained workers and production facilities
must be maintained to meet future challenges
to national security.
- Increase utilization of the merchant marine
for navy support functions to increase
mobility while reserving trained navy crews
for an expanded naval fleet.
- Ensure that U.S.-flag ships carry an
equitable portion of U.S. trade. Recognize
the restrictive and preferential trade
policies of foreign nations and be prepared
to respond constructively to them to main-
tain our trade interests.
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- Restore cost-competitiveness of U.S.-flag
operation in international trade. The
system of operational and construction
subsidies failed to maintain parity in the
1970's. Corrective action must be taken
to ensure the survival and growth of the
merchant marine and shipbuilding industry.
- Revitalize the domestic water transportation
system, recognizing it as an economical and
fuel efficient way to link the nation's
producing heart land to all four coasts and
to America's international trading partners.
- Reduce the severe regulatory environment
which inhibits American competitiveness. A
review of the effects of restrictions will
be conducted, and appropriate action init-
iated to reduce the operational and regula-
tory restrictions which prevent U.S. ships
and shipyards from meeting foreign compe-
tition.
Inspite of the full support voiced for maritime
revitalization by Ronald Reagan during the 1980 President-
ial campaign, a fully developed and comprehensive maritime
policy was still not in place as his Administration moved
into its third year. Policy remained to be transformed
into workable programs and legislative action.
During 1981 the most significant achievement in
maritime reform was the transfer of the Maritime Admini-
stration from the Department of Commerce to the Department
of Transportation. This logical step was taken in August
concurrent with the appointment of Drew Lewis as Secretary
of Transportation. The move, originally proposed in
1966, recognized the status of the merchant marine as
part of an increasingly inter-dependent transportation
system and placed it under the department most concerned
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with coordinating transportation programs. Transportation
Secretary Drew Lewis was a vocal and articulate proponent
of maritime reform; and his appointment, along with the
shift of MARAD to Transportation seemed a propitious
beginning to the Reagan program.
Initial elements of the Reagan Administration mari-
time policy objectives were not made public until May 1982
when the President, in proclaiming 22 Mayas National
Maritime Day, said:
For too long, our shipping industry has been
in a state of decline, and its ability to
meet the nation's economic and defense needs
has eroded. My Administration is firmly com-
mitted to the re~uvination of the American
merchant marine.~
Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis, President Reagan's
spokesman for maritime affairs. outline the first phase
of the Reagan program on 20 May, alluding to further ele-
ments which would be forthcoming as part of a "continuing
formulation process:"47
- Support extension of the temporary authority
approved by Congress in August 1981 for ODS
flag ship operators to build or acquire
vessels abroad without losing their operating-
differential subsidy.
- Provide immediate eligibility for reflagged
vessels to carry government-impelled cargos.
Public Law 664 currently requires such vessels
to be registered under the U.S. flag for three
years before they can carry these cargos.
- Reform the Administration of ODS by DOT/MARAD
to increase operating flexibility and reduce
cost of the program.
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- Encourage foreign investment in U.S.-flag
shipping, allowing the foreign part ownership
of U.S. vessels to increase from 49 to 75
percent. This would attract needed capital
to the industry, but retain U.S. management
control.
- Relieve U.S.-flag ships of the 50 percent
ad valorum duty currently imposed on repairs
conducted abroad, allowing operators the
flexibility to have such repairs performed
and reduce the repair cost to the ODS.
- Reduce unnecessary regulation of the ship
operating and shipbuilding industries.
Establish a government-industry group to
further that effort.
- Support elimination of FMC regulations
governing the level of rates of liner
operators in domestic trades which, under
the Jones Act are reserved to U.S. built,
U.S. owned and U.S. crewed vessels.
On August 5, 1982 Secretary Lewis announced elements
of the second phase of the Reagan maritime program develop-
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ment:
- Increase ceiling on Title XI ship financing
guarantees for FY 1983 to $900 million from
the prescribed $600 million. The additional
$300 million is to be held in reserve by the
Secretary of Transportation for national
security purposes.
- Grant permission to U.S. flag vessel operators
to use tax-deferred Capital Construction Fund
(CCF) deposits to build or acquire vessels
abroad.
- Expand use of non-government civilian sea-
farers to crew vessels operated by the Depart-
ment of Defense.
Once again Secretary Lewis referred to this policy develop-
ment as an evolving process which would produce further
elements to address the long-standing problems of the ship-
ping and shipbuilding industry.
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Policy towards subsidies, cabotage and cargo pref-
erence, though not specifically enumerated above, were
addressed by Secretary Lewis in August. The Administration
favors a continuation of the FY 1982-83 moratorium on pay-
ment of CDS funds. It also is opposed to initiating any
new ODS contracts, although existing contracts would con-
tinue to be honored. The domestic trade would continue to
receive full protection from foreign competition under the
aegis of the Jones Act which was reaffirmed by the Reagan
Administration. To address the issue of cargo preference,
which is increasingly practiced by foreign trading states,
the Administration intends to form a study group under
the Secretary of Transportation, and with representation
from the State Department, to study U.S. . 49optlons.
The maritime program of President Reagan is con-
sistent to a substantial degree with his philosophy of
freeing private industry from dependency on direct govern-
ment support, and encumbrance by excessive government
regulation. It significantly marks the first fundamentally
different approach to promotion of the merchant marine
since the nineteenth century granting of mail contracts,
the precursor of long-evolving sytems of government
support and regulation now firmly established through
the 1936 Act and subsequent amendments.
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Congressional Action
During the first two years of the Administration
nearly two dozen bills were introduced in Congress which
directly pertained to the regulation and support of the
U.S. flag merchant marine. Only three were signed into
law by the President: MARAD Transfer (HR 4074); the 1981
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which eliminated con-
struction differential subsidies; and the 1982 Maritime
Authorization (HR-2526, HR 3982, S-1017) which allowed
U.S. flag foreign-built ships to receive ODS funds through
FY 1982. 5 0
Other important legislation introduced in the 97th
Congress which would have promoted the competitiveness of
the merchant marine in foreign trade, but which failed
to be enacted, included:
- H.R. 3786 - Merchant Marine Vessel Tax
Amendments of 1981 - a bill which would have
provided for a depreciation tax write off for
U.S. built vessels of one year, and foreign-
built U.S.-flag vessels of five years, which
would have been more in line with foreign
practice. U.S. owners now have a minimum
14.5 year depreciation write-off.
- H.R. 6979 - Competitive Shipping and Ship-
building Act of 1982 - a bill to promote
carriage of bulk cargos aboard U.S. ships
in international trade.
- H.R. 4374/S. 1593 - Maritime Regulatory
Reform - a bill to clarify the immunity
of the U.S. liner industry from anti-trust
regulations when participating in inter-
national trade as part of liner conferences.
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The central issue in maritime reform which was
debated in the 97th Congress was the Administration backed
proposals to grant broader anti-trust immunity to the U.S.
liner industry. Two bills, H.R. 4374 and S. 1593, were
introduced in August 1981 and were the focus of debate for
over a year. The purpose of these bills was to reaffirm
the intent of the Shipping Act of 1916 to exempt u.S. flag
ships operating in liner conferences in the international
trade from the anti-trust laws of the United States.
Proponents of the bill who represented all segments of the
industry, including ship owners, shippers, labor and ship-
builders, argued that this type of regulatory reform was
necessasry to allow U.S. liners to compete on an equal
footing with foreign liners in the conference trades. This
would be accomplished by allowing common carriers complete
immunity to anti-trust laws while joining in conference
activities to fix rates and condition of service; pool
earnings, losses and traffic; restrict the number of sail-
ings; prevent competition; and meet with shippers to dis-
S 1
cuss general rate levels, practices and services. Such
agreements would have to be filed with the FMC, but would
become effective, barring FMC objection, within forty-five
days of filing. Under current procedures conferences are
required to demonstrate that proposed agreements meet
public interest standards before the FMC will grant
approval. This procedure is often costly and lengthy,
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and is subject to protracted litigation and unfavorable
judicial interpretations.
The House version of this bill (H.R. 4374) ultimately
won broad support within Congress, the Administration, and
industry; and was passed by a 350-33 vote in September 1981.
Opposition to this form of maritime reform was both
impassioned and vociferous. Consumers groups and the
National Farmers Union, among others, feared that the broad
anti-trust immunity granted by these bills would result in
higher consumer prices for imported goods and reduced com-
petitiveness of U.S. exports as a result of higher shipping
rates and less competition among common carriers. Econo-
mist Allen Ferguson, Chairman of the National Institute of
Economics and Law, has asserted that shipping rates could
increase 10-20 percent if anti-trust immunity is granted
I " f 52to 1ner con erences.
Strong editorials in the New York Times and Wall
Street Journal during the summer of 1982 opposed the
impending anti-trust legislation, voicing the opinion
shared by many that anti-trust immunity for the liner com-
panies is essentially unfair to the rest of U.S. industry
and the non-liner segment of the shipping industry. Others
felt that cartels, another word for conferences, are in
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themselves essentially bad. Fear of them is deeply
rooted in American economic tradition as the principal
nemeses of free trade. Herein lies an odd dichotomy in
61
President Reagan's political philosophy and his maritime
policy. His advocacy of free trade and free competition
would dictate opposition to anti-competitive practices of
conferences or cartels, but his support of the anti-trust
immunity measures of this legislation supports his policy
that business should be free from excessive government
regulation in order to operate most efficiently. In the
case of the U.S. liner industry, the most important
remaining segment of the U.S.-flag merchant marine, the
Administration has recognized the key fact that U.S.
liners operate in an international arena quite different
from the domestic business environment, and where free
trade principles no longer hold sway.
Another criticism of the Reagan position in support
of liner cartels is that higher cargo tariffs resulting
from less competition among carriers will transfer the
burden of government operating support from the ODS
subsidy payments to the consumer. It has been estimated
that U.S. liners would earn an additional $1 billion
dollars annually as a result of a 20 percent rise in
liner freight rates. Foreign carriers would reap an
additional $2 billion dollars. 5 4 Whether the criticism
is fair is uncertain, but the position is consistent
with the stated policy of the Administration "that the
U.S. fleet must become competitive to the extent possible
b . d ,,55without further su S1 y.
62
Both the House and Senate shipping bills died with-
out being enacted into law as a result of successful efforts
by Senator Howard Metzenbaum and his supporters to block
S. 1593 in the Senate. The year 1982 thus passed without
congressional enactment of major comprehensive maritime
reform.
The evolving process of maritime policy formulation
continues into 1983 with the 98th Congress. A decisive
breakthrough in this process occurred on March 1 when the
Senate passed the Shipping Act of 1983 (S. 47) by a 2 to 1
margin. This legislation has essentially the same pro-
visions as the controversial bills H.R. 4374 and S. 1593
which died in 1982. After years of debate and stalemates
on the issue, Congress is close (pending final House
approval) to granting the U.S.-flag liner industry the anti-
trust immunity they have deemed necessary to enable their
competitive participation in the foreign-dominated liner
conferences which service U.S. trade routes. The House
version of this bill, H.R. 1878, has won unanimous approval
from the Merchant Marine and Fisheries committee, and is
almost assured of passage when it reaches the floor of
56the House in May 1983.
The 1983 Act greatly broadens anti-trust immunity
prescribed in the Shipping Act of 1916 by deleting the
requirement that conference agreements (tariffs) receive
prior FMC approval before going into effect, and deleting
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the requirement that conferences must demonstrate that
proposed changes to tariffs meet a public interest standard.
Conference agreements under the new Act would become
effective 45 days after filing with the FMC. In essence,
anti-competitive measures can go into effect without
approval from a regulatory agency. The burden of proof
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for challenging them now lies with the complainant.
Other salient points of the 1983 Act include:5 8
1. The FMC will enforce cartel agreements which
are filed with it.
2. Conferences serving the U.S. cannot restrict
membership.
3. Ocean carriers are only subject to the
jurisdiction of the FMC, not the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) or the Justice Department.
4. Individuals can no longer collect treble
damages under the Clayton Act in suits against conference
members.
5. Conferences can post intermodal rates through
to inland destinations or origins.
6. Shipper's Councils are not allowed by the
Act, although small shippers can join together in joint
ventures.
If the 1983 Shipping Act achieves its intended
purpose it should permit greater cooperation and ration-
alization of services among ocean carriers, and allow
harmonization of U.S. shipping practices with those of
foreign competitors and fellow conference members. Towards
this end it sets out as policy objective the development
and maintenance of "an efficient ocean transportation
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system through commercial means, with minimum government
involvement in order to serve the needs of United States
f i .59ore gn commerce. Maritime Administrator, Adm. Harold
E. Shear has said, ·The Shipping Act of 1983 is the corner-
stone of our policy because reforms in the U.S. regulation
of ocean shipping are vital to the recovery and competitive-
ness of the U.S.-flag liner operations in our export-inport
d .60tra e.
The most severely depressed segment of the U.S.
shipping industry is that of the bulk carriers which now
haul less than 4 percent of all U.S. bulk imports and
exports. Legislation to promote this sector of the
merchant marine was introduced in the House by Represent-
ative Lindy Boggs in February 1983 as the Competitive
Shipping and Shipbuilding Act of 1983 (H.R. 1242). It
is identical to H.R. 6979, introduced but not acted on
in 1982, and is a cargo reservation scheme designed to
boost the percentage of bulk cargos carried on U.S. flag
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ships and increase the demand for U.S.-built ships.
It has been estimated that 184 bulk carriers would be
required in 1998 to carry 20 percent of U.S. bulk cargos.
One hundred fifty-eight new U.S.-built ships would be
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required to meet this goal. Rep. Boggs maintains, ·Passage
of this legislation will help achieve one of the long-
standing objectives of the Congress as well as one of
President Reagan's goals, that is, to ensure an American
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merchant fleet capable of carrying a fair portion of our
Nation's foreign trade.~3
Specifically, the bill requires the reservation of
5 percent of all U.S. bulk imports and exports (by tonnage)
to U.S.-flag ships in 1984. The amount will increase 1
percent per year for the next 15 years until 20 percent of
all bulk imports and exports are carried in U.S. ships.
Guideline rates for the carriage of bulk cargos on U.S.
ships would be established by the Secretary of Transpor-
tation. The Secretary is also tasked with estimating
after enactment of the law the current costs of operating
various classes of U.S. bulk carriers, and the cost of
constructing various classes of U.S. bulk carriers in
U.S. shipyards. The cost of each activity would be
required to be 15 percent below the Secretary's base-line
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estimate within two years of the bill's enactment.
Cargo preference legislation has traditionally
garnered strong support from labor and shipbuilding
interests, but has in the past been vigorously opposed
by non-maritime elements of the business community,
particularly importers, exporters and farmers. It is
generally believed that the requirement to ship on more
expensive U.S. vessels takes the competitive edge off
u.s. exports and increases the cost of foreign imports.
The provision of H.R. 1242 which mandates 15 percent
reduction in ship operating and and construction costs
is intended to assuage such concerns.
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The prognosis for ultimate passage of this legis-
lation is uncertain. While this bill effectively ad-
dresses a serious deficiency in the U.S.-flag merchant
marine and is consistent in concept with foreign shipping
practices. it represents a form of remedy to America's
maritime malady which the Reagan Administration has here-
tofore chosen not to embrace. Though recognizing that
foreign cargo alloction requirements pose a challenge to
U.S. operators6 5• the Administration has not gone beyond
considering options and entering into consultations with
European and Japanese trading partners on the issues of
bilateral cargo agreements and response to the UNCTAD
66liner code.
The previous pages have discussed legislative
measures now pending which would provide major support
to both the liner and bulk segments of the maritime
industry. On January 26. 1983 Senator Inouye of Hawaii
introduced legislation (S. 125) into the Senate to
appropriate $200 million for FY 1984 to reactivate the
construction differential subsidy which was discontinued
by the Reagan Administration in 1981. The bill also would
authorize raising the statutory $12 billion ceiling on the
Title XI construction loan guarantees program to $15
b Ol l O 671 10n.
The introduction of this bill highlights the con-
cern of many members of congress and the shipbuilding
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industry that the Reagan Maritime policy is not doing
enough to save, let alone promote, u.s. shipbuilding.
Senator Inouye states, "The Congress has been waiting
over two years for an alternate proposal from the Admini-
stration and it has not been forthcoming. In the
interests of national security and a strong merchant
marine, I do not believe we can delay any longer." 68
The renewal of CDS, is contrary to the objectives
of the Reagan maritime policy. Current treasury deficits,
government-wide funding cutbacks, and the failure of
billions of dollars in past subsidies to produce a strong
merchant marine make it unlikely that the Reagan Admini-
stration will approve this bill.
The Reagan Administration's committment to the
nation's shipbuilding base is currently manifested in
two programs: the Title XI construction loan guarantee
program, and the massive navy shipbuilding and conversion
program. The Administration has proposed a $900 million
ceiling on loan guarantees for FY 1984 which it believes
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adequate to cover anticipated needs. Naval construction
and sealift conversion and charter programs are expected
to boost production in U.S. shipyards. Thirty-two vessel
construction and conversion contracts were let by the
government to private yards in 1982 as the beginning of
the 600 ship Navy buildup got underway. The Navy's "T
Ship" program, intended to provide sealift capability
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for logistic support, should provide substantial work
for shipyards not otherwise capable of complex naval
construction. Contracts for nine new construction sealift
vessels and twelve merchant ship conversions were let with
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seven private shipyards under this program in 1982.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
The stated maritime program of the Reagan Admini-
stration represents a clear departure from the costly and
ultimately unproductive course that federal policy has
pursued since 1936. In this sense it represents a step in
the right direction towards restoring the economic vitality
of the U.S. Merchant Marine. The program suffers, however,
from two major problems: lack of comprehensiveness and
slowness of implementation. The piecemeal approach to ad-
dressing the problems of the merchant marine has resulted
in an uneven and inequitable implementation of new policy.
Legislation currently pending in Congress promises
to provide substantial increases in the size and competi-
tiveness of the merchant marine. The Shipping Act of 1983,
almost assured of passage, should enable U.S. liners to
compete in the liner conference trades on a much more
equitable footing with their foreign competitors. The Com-
petitive Shipping and Shipbuilding Act of 1983 has the
potential, if passed, to provide substantive growth in the
U.S.-flag bulk carrier fleet and a large boost to the U.S.
merchant shipbuilding industry.
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The elimination of the construction differential
subsidy in 1981 marks a watershed in modern U.S. maritime
policy, and along with a proposed phaseout of operating
differential subsidy marks the beginning of the end of
direct and massive cash support to the maritime industry
by the federal government. This is an encouraging step
because it finally breaks the burdensome link which has
bound U.S.-flag operators to an inefficient shipbuilding
industry.
The elimination of CDS and the proposed elimination
of the SO percent ad valorem maintenance and repair tariffs
could be a major blow to the U.S. shipbuilding and ship
repair industries if swift and decisive action is not taken
by the Administration to provide compensating incentives for
investment in this sector of the industry. Continuance of
the highly successful Title XI loan guarantee program, the
capital construction fund, and the construction reserve
funds should be continued. Low interest loans, accelerated
depreciation, and additional tax breaks should be considered
to encourage ship owners to buy from U.S. yards.
The Reagan navy and military sealift shipbuilding
programs will provide enough work to sustain a substantial
portion of the U.S. shipbuilding base until long term
policy solutions are implemented. A prolonged dependence
on government contracts alone, however, will not encourage
fundamental changes in efficiency which will allow U.S.
yards to compete with foreign shipbuilders. For a truly
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healthy commercial maritime industry measures must be imple-
mented to wean U.S. shipbuilders away from heavy dependence
on military shipbuilding contracts.
The future for a U.S.-flag bulk cargo fleet rests
with the fate of H.R. 1242 which has not yet been acted
upon by Congress. Its passage would promote through cargo
reservation schemes substantial real growth in the bulk
cargo fleet over the next 16 years. However, several major
problems have the potential to block this measure. First,
major U.S. corporations with a proprietary interest in the
shipping of bulk cargos are very comfortable conducting
their trade under "flags of convenience. They cannot be
expected to support the creation of U.S.-flag bulk cargo
fleet that would run in competition to their foreign flag
assets and increase shipping costs. Similarly, American
importers and exporters who would experience higher ship-
ping costs on U.S. ships can not be expected to support
this measure. Thirdly, the Boggs bill runs ahead of the
Reagan Administration policy on cargo preference, which
has not yet been fully enunciated.
The Administration must determine its policy on the
cargo preference issue before Congress enacts any form of
enabling legislation. It should decide to implement a
system of bilateral shipping agreements between the U.S.
and its major trading partners, or, in the case of liners,
become a party to the UNCTAD liner code. The U.S. should
recognize that free trade and open markets do not prevail
in the world of shipping.
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As the Administration acknowl-
edged this reality in supporting the anti-trust immunity
measures for liner conferences, so should it also be pre-
pared to relinquish its free trade posture in the area of
cargo reservation. Otherwise cross trade shipping forced
out of foreign trade routes by other countries' bilateral
agreements and the UNCTAD liner code will increasingly
flock to the still-open U.S. trade, resulting in over ton-
naging of u.S. trade routes and untenable competition for
U.S. flagships. In implementing a cargo reservation policy
government would ensure U.S.-flag shipping an equitable
portion of U.S. foreign trade and increase the demand for
U.S.-built ships. Shippers might not be universally satis-
fied with this arrangement, but at least it would be con-
sistent with world practice.
Much remains to be done if the Reagan program is to
be translated into a new and comprehensive maritime policy
for the United States. Accelerated regulatory reform,
enhanced economic incentives, and a more realistic and prag-
matic U.S. role in the international ocean shipping regime
is essential to success in this endeavor. The government
must take the lead in shaping this new policy; but a new
cooperative spirit among the diverse elements of the mari-
time industry, labor, and government - something hereto-
fore lacking - will be essential if a successful strategy
for maritime recovery is to be evolved.
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